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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 The Committee of Unsecured Creditors (“the 
Committee”) on behalf of the Estate of the Lemington Home 
for the Aged (“the Home”) appeals the District Court‟s 
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of defendants, 
the officers and directors of the Home, on the Committee‟s 
breach of fiduciary duty and deepening insolvency claims.  
The District Court found that summary judgment was 
appropriate because the business judgment rule and the 
doctrine of in pari delicto barred recovery on the breach of 
fiduciary duty claims, and because the Committee was unable 
to demonstrate a material issue of fact concerning whether the 
defendants committed the fraud necessary to support a claim 
of deepening insolvency.  Because our independent review of 
the record discloses genuine disputes of material facts on all 
claims, we will vacate and remand for trial. 
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I. 
 The Home, a nonprofit corporation, has a storied place 
in history.  As the city of Pittsburgh grew in influence as an 
industrial and manufacturing center in the 19
th
 century, its 
diverse population swelled.  By 1870, the city had a 
population of 86,076, a 74% increase in just ten years.  
Among this population were about 2,000 African-Americans, 
mostly free blacks who had been born in the North, a few 
post-Civil War migrants from the South, as well as some 
runaway slaves and their descendants.  Many of these people 
did not share in the industrial prosperity enveloping the city, 
struggling both to make ends meet and to secure the civil 
rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution. 
 In 1877, Mary Peck Bond, a daughter of Pittsburgh 
African-American abolitionist and minister John Peck, is said 
to have discovered that her friend, former slave and then-
centenarian “Aunt Peggy,” was living alone in squalor in a 
damp basement.  Together with friends, Mrs. Bond worked to 
raise funds to provide a place of refuge for elderly members 
of the African-American community.  This effort‟s first 
incarnation, “The Home for the Aged and Infirm Colored 
Women,” was incorporated and dedicated on July 4, 1883.  
Eventually, this facility would become known as the 
“Lemington Home for the Aged,” also known as “Lemington 
Center.”  The Home was affiliated with Lemington Elder 
Care Services, with which it had an interlocking Board of 
Directors.  In 1983, the Home was relocated to a facility on 
Lincoln Avenue in Pittsburgh, and expanded to about 180 
beds. 
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 Almost immediately from the time of its relocation in 
1983, the Home was beset with financial troubles.  In its first 
year at the new facility, the Home operated at a loss of 
$429,000.  Although an initial projection had indicated that 
the Home would profit, this was based on “the Center being 
aggressively marketed to produce . . . a more even mix of 
Medicare, Medicaid, and private pay patients.”  (Id. at 271.)  
Instead, “95% of [the Home‟s] patients receiv[ed] Medicaid, 
4.5% Medicare and 0.5% private payors.”  (Id.) 
 This stagnation continued through the 1980s and into 
the 1990s.  Because the Home‟s financial condition was 
rapidly deteriorating, the City of Pittsburgh, Allegheny 
County, and several private foundations periodically assisted 
to keep the Home in operation.  By late 1986, the Home was 
again maintaining its own operations, but had $4 million in 
deferred mortgage debt. 
 Unfortunately, the Home‟s financial condition again 
deteriorated.  The U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services implemented a month-long ban on new admissions 
in September, 1998.  A comprehensive long-range plan 
formulated at the Home‟s direction by Hershberg Salter 
Associates in 1997 found that the Home had image problems 
within the community, and recommended, among other 
things, that it should hire an Administrator, a “quality human 
resources staff,” and outside specialists.  (Id. at 280-81.) 
 Defendant Melody L. Causey was hired as the Home‟s 
Administrator in September, 1997.  By 1999, the Home was 
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insolvent.  “Going concern” warnings1 accompanied audits 
for fiscal years 2002 and 2003.
2
  As of June 30, 2002, the 
Home‟s total liabilities exceeded total assets by $1,941,959, 
and total liabilities exceeded total assets by $1,675,397 at the 
end of the 2003 fiscal year.  In 2001, a study funded by the 
Pittsburgh Foundation recommended that the Board replace 
Causey with a “qualified, seasoned nursing home 
administrator,” (A. 1179) and “review, revamp and re-staff 
each department” (A. 1214).  The Foundation provided a 
grant of more than $175,000 to hire a new Administrator.  
Causey, however, decided to use the grant for other purposes.   
 In December of 2002, Defendant James Shealey 
became the Home‟s Chief Financial Officer.  Shealey failed 
to maintain a general ledger, and the Home‟s financial and 
billing records were in deplorable condition.  In March of 
2004, the Board was informed that employee insurance 
premiums were not paid even though payroll deductions had 
been made for that purpose. 
 Beginning in 2003, the Home was cited for numerous 
deficiencies “primarily as a result of staff failing to document 
services rendered.”  (Id. at 1355.)  Causey commented that 
“we continue to employ staff that should no longer be 
employed by our organization” and “in the last eighteen 
months, the nursing department alone caused the facility to 
receive[] 22 nursing care deficiencies.”  (Id. at 1527.)  
According to Causey, in April or May, 2004, she informed 
                                              
1
 The “going concern” notices are intended to warn 
that the “continued viability of an enterprise is in doubt.”  (A. 
6.) 
2
 The Home‟s fiscal year ended on June 30th. 
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the Board of Directors that, due to health problems, she had 
been placed on part-time work status by her physicians.  
According to her administrative assistant, she was absent 
from the Home for periods of up to six or eight weeks at a 
time.  She was not replaced, although state law required the 
Home to employ a full-time, licensed administrator. 
 From November of 2003 to January of 2005, the Board 
position of Treasurer was vacant.  The Treasurer was to chair 
the Board‟s Finance Committee.  There is evidence that there 
was no meaningful oversight of the Home‟s financial 
operations during this period. 
 In May of 2004, Causey recommended that the Home 
file for bankruptcy.  The Board opted to pursue other options 
at that time.  One of the options was obtaining a $1,000,000 
loan from the Lemington Home Fund, which was 
administered by the Pittsburgh Foundation.  Approval of the 
loan was conditioned upon the Board having a viability study 
conducted.  The Board declined to pursue such a study. 
 The Home‟s problems came to a head on July 26, 
2004, when resident Terry Norwood, who suffered from 
advanced diabetes, was found unresponsive without a pulse.  
Although he had an advanced directive which specified that, 
if he ceased to breathe, he should be resuscitated, no such 
action was taken.  Instead, a nurse left a message on a 
physician‟s pager.  Because of this death, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Health cited the home for neglect, placed the 
Home‟s license on provisional status, and provided a 90-day 
window for the Home to correct its deficiencies. 
 The Home‟s accounting firm declined to continue to 
work for the Home in the Fall of 2004 due to non-payment of 
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its bills.  A medical records and billing consultant terminated 
her services in August of 2004 due to non-payment. 
 Another resident, Elaine Carrington, died at the Home 
on December 17, 2004, under circumstances suggesting 
neglect.  Because of this death, the Pennsylvania Department 
of Health conducted another investigation.  Among other 
things, the Department noted that “[a]n administrator, or a 
designee, is not present on the premises on a 24-hr. basis.  In 
the administrator‟s frequent absence, staff are confused as to 
whom is to be in charge of the PC Unit.”  (Id. at 1379.)  The 
Department further noted that “[t]he Administrator failed to 
report . . . the unusual death of resident EC on 12/19/04” (id. 
at 1385) and it “determined that the Administrator, Mel 
Causey, lack[ed] the qualifications, the knowledge of the PC 
regulations and the ability to direct staff to perform personal 
care services as required”  (id. at 1393.)   
 At the time of these incidents, records indicate that the 
Board itself was in disarray.  Minutes of Board meetings were 
incomplete or non-existent.  Administrator Causey noted in a 
deposition that minutes were never kept of executive sessions, 
at which compensation, among other issues, was discussed.  
Attendance at Board meetings was often below 50%.  
Although the Board‟s by-laws required a Finance Committee 
with the Board Treasurer as chairperson, the position of 
Treasurer remained unfilled.  Instead, the Board relied on the 
advice of Chief Financial Officer Shealey, although, as Board 
Chair Arthur Baldwin noted in his deposition, the Board was 
aware as early as December 2004 that Shealey was not 
maintaining financial records. 
 At its meeting on January 6, 2005, the Board 
considered options in case a proposed merger with the 
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University of Pittsburgh Medical Center did not occur.  The 
Board considered two options: bankruptcy and restructuring.  
At this meeting, the Board voted “to close the nursing home 
and assisted living entities,” “to retain Eva P. Mitchell, 
community services [sic] and, if possible, Lemington 
Residential Corporation #2,” and “to continue pursuing 
UPMC for a possible merger/acquisition of Lemington.”  (Id. 
at 1371.)   
 The Board did not approve the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition for another three months.  Instead, at its January 
meeting, the Board “agreed to stop admissions to [the nursing 
home and assisted living facility] immediately.”  (Id. at 
1372.)  At this meeting, the Board further noted that it was 
“informed that Mel Causey ha[d] been working from home on 
a part-time basis for several months and, as such, was not in 
control of the activities that were taking place at the 
facilities.”  (Id.)  The Board voted to terminate Ms. Causey.  
In March, 2005, the Board hired Elizabeth Garrett as an 
administrator.  The Board informed Ms. Garrett that, because 
it had decided to declare bankruptcy, the facility would not be 
receiving new patients. 
 Handwritten notes from a Board meeting held on 
March 15, 2005 indicate discussion of plans to transfer the 
Home‟s principal charitable asset, the Lemington Home 
Fund, held by the Pittsburgh Foundation, to Lemington Elder 
Care, an affiliated entity.  The members of the Home‟s Board 
were also directors of Lemington Elder Care.  By March 17, 
2005, the Pennsylvania Department of Health determined that 
the Home‟s deficiencies had been corrected.  On March 24, 
2005, a document called the “Lemington Elder Care 
Transition Action Plan” was created, which, among other 
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things, provided for the “Lemington Elder Services 
restructuring process,” to “Close Lemington Nursing Home 
and Assisted Living Facilities,” “Obtain funding to assist with 
the transition and restructuring of Lemington Elder Care,” 
“Enlist all possible selling options of the Lemington Nursing 
Home and Assisted Living Facility,” “Conduct Bankruptcy 
Filing of Lemington Nursing Home & Assisted Living 
Entities,” and “Restructure Lemington Elder Care to include 
Community Services, Eva P. Mitchell and HUD #2 Project.”  
(Id. at 812-815.)  Consistent with the plan to shift the Home‟s 
principal charitable asset to Lemington Elder Care, on May 
27, 2005, Chairperson Baldwin drafted a letter to be signed 
by the Pennsylvania Secretary of Aging, requesting that the 
Pittsburgh Foundation provide  
financial assistance to be used by Lemington 
Center for legal counsel, communications 
support, insurance and the services of a 
turnaround expert in order to orchestrate a 
caring, orderly and safe transition for its nursing 
home and assisted living residents as 
Lemington Center discontinues nursing home 
and assisted living services and works through 
bankruptcy reorganization. 
 
(Id. at 808.) 
 On April 13, 2005, the Home filed a voluntary Chapter 
11 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania.  The Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors was appointed two weeks later.  In early 
May, W. Terrence Brown was hired by one of Lemington‟s 
creditors to investigate the company‟s financial situation.  
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According to Brown‟s report, Shealey “admitted that the 
general ledger and accounting system had not been 
maintained „for some time‟ because of lack of staff and 
trained staff.”  (Id. at 878.)  Furthermore, Mr. Brown reported 
that he was unable to obtain “records of any checks written, 
deposits made, bank statements or bank statement 
reconciliations for any month of the current fiscal year. . . . I 
do know that accounting records problems go back to at least 
November 2003 and I do not know if the accounting system 
itself was maintained after November 2003.”  (Id. at 879.)  
Importantly, Mr. Brown also related that “[t]he billing clerk 
also admitted and Mr. Shealey confirmed that no Medicare 
billings had been submitted to Medicare since at least August 
2004. . . . I estimate that during this period there were 
approximately 2,000 unbilled Medicare patient days.”  (Id.) 
 On June 9, 2005, the Bankruptcy Court directed the 
Debtor-in-Possession to obtain a viability study from 
PrimusCare, a company previously hired by the Debtor.  In its 
report dated June 22, 2005, PrimusCare first noted that “[t]he 
facility cannot operate in its current condition . . . and without 
an influx of anticipated Medicare Recovery Funds would be 
insolvent by the beginning of August. . . . Claim recovery 
efforts are currently underway.”  (Id. at 1582.)  Among other 
things, PrimusCare further opined that  
[t]he overall knowledge of the Department 
Heads appears to be limited.  Many have been 
placed into positions without solid training on 
the main functions of their duties.  Basic 
internal controls are missing in many key areas 
including census tracking, accounts receivable, 
accounts payable, payroll, and resident trust 
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accounts. . . . Without these key internal 
controls in place the facility is unable to 
monitor and track financial performance.   
 
(Id. at 1594.)
3
 
 PrimusCare also highlighted a number of positive 
factors for the Home, including a high local population of 
senior citizens, support from local government officials and 
families, and local hospital interest in referring patients to the 
Home.  Consequently, PrimusCare concluded, if the Home 
improved its image, recruited and developed qualified staff, 
and secured approximately $2 million in working capital 
needed to make necessary reforms, it could achieve the 90% 
occupancy rate necessary to continue operations.  PrimusCare 
suggested that some of the necessary funding could be 
obtained by, among other things, collecting approximately 
$500,000 in unpaid Medicare reimbursements, appealing to 
government sources for rate relief, and re-working the 
Home‟s debt structure and the collective bargaining 
                                              
3
 This lack of records was underscored in a later e-mail 
detailing PrimusCare‟s efforts to reconstruct the Home‟s 
financial records:  “The indicated available funds from 
[Medicare claims] . . . is substantially less than the amount 
estimated due [to] our discovery of the following:  1[.]  The 
census data was not accurate. . . . 2. A number of the patients 
did not have appropriate documentation . . . . it is hard to 
appreciate the lack of any viable financial structure.  Virtually 
all information we have sought in order to complete the 
claims for submission has required painful searching an[d] 
searching in order to construct/reconstruct the information 
required.”  (A. 1849.) 
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agreement.  Notably, PrimusCare recommended that “board 
members with for-profit, long term care management 
experience” should be added, that “[e]ngaging a seasoned, 
long term care management company with local and diverse 
management experience is essential,” and that “[r]ecruitment 
of key personnel with tremendous experience is vital.”  (A. 
1596.) 
 The Home delayed filing its Monthly Operating 
Reports for May and June until September 2005.  If they had 
been filed, they would have shown that the Home received 
nearly $1.4 million in Nursing Home Assessment Tax 
payments. 
 At a Bankruptcy status conference held on June 23, 
2005, no one expressed any interest in funding or acquiring 
the Home.  Consequently, the Bankruptcy Court approved 
closure of the Home and the transfer of its residents to other 
facilities. 
 On November 27, 2005, the Bankruptcy Judge granted 
the Committee‟s motion to commence an adversary 
proceeding against the Home‟s directors and officers.  On 
August 27, 2007, the Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors filed its Second Amended Complaint on behalf of 
the Debtor, asserting causes of action against the directors 
and officers for breach of the fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty and for deepening insolvency.  On September 10, 
2010, the directors and officers filed a Joint Motion for 
Summary Judgment.  On October 25, 2010, the District Court 
granted the motion, finding that the business judgment rule 
and the doctrine of in pari delicto applied to preclude the 
Committee‟s breach of fiduciary duty claims.  The District 
Court also found that, even considering the evidence in the 
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light most favorable to the Committee, the Committee would 
be unable to show that there was fraud necessary to support a 
claim of deepening insolvency.  This appeal followed.
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II. 
 Our review of a District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors of Allegheny Health, Educ. and Research Found. v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 607 F.3d 346, 351 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “[t]he 
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  A material fact is “[a] fact[] that might affect 
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”  Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  For an issue 
to be genuine, “all that is required is that sufficient evidence 
supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a 
jury or judge to resolve the parties‟ differing versions of the 
truth at trial.”  Id. at 248-49 (quoting First National Bank of 
Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 Because Appellants have brought claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty as well as for deepening insolvency, we will 
examine whether summary judgment is appropriate for each 
of these in turn. 
                                              
4
 In this bankruptcy adversary proceeding, the District 
Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1334(b).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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A. 
 Pennsylvania law, which codifies the fiduciary duties 
owed by directors and officers of a corporation, provides as 
follows for directors: 
A director of a nonprofit corporation shall stand 
in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and 
shall perform his duties as a director . . . in good 
faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be 
in the best interests of the corporation and with 
such care, including reasonable inquiry, skill 
and diligence, as a person of ordinary prudence 
would use under similar circumstances. In 
performing his duties, a director shall be 
entitled to rely in good faith on information, 
opinions, reports or statements, including 
financial statements and other financial data, in 
each case prepared or presented by any of the 
following:  (1) One or more officers or 
employees of the corporation whom the director 
reasonably believes to be reliable and 
competent in the matters presented.   (2) 
Counsel, public accountants or other persons as 
to matters which the director reasonably 
believes to be within the professional or expert 
competence of such person. . . . (b) Effect of 
actual knowledge.  – A director shall not be 
considered to be acting in good faith if he has 
knowledge concerning the matter in question 
that would cause his reliance to be unwarranted. 
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15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5712(a)-(b) (2011).  The standard of 
care for officers is set forth as follows: 
[A]n officer shall perform his duties as an 
officer in good faith, in a manner he reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation and with such care, including 
reasonable inquiry, skill and diligence, as a 
person of ordinary prudence would use under 
similar circumstances. 
 
Id. § 5712(c).  These fiduciary duties are owed not only to the 
corporation and its shareholders, but also to the creditors of 
an insolvent entity.  See Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd. v. 
Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 160 F.3d 
982, 987-88 (3d. Cir. 1998).  Certainly, then, it is material 
whether the directors‟ reliance upon the information provided 
by one or more officers or employees was in “good faith,” 
and whether there was a reasonable basis for relying upon 
officers and employees of the corporation.  It is likewise 
material whether the officers have exercised “reasonable 
inquiry, skill and diligence” in performing their duties. 
 In support of its claim of a breach of the duty of due 
care, the Committee contends that the Board relied on 
Administrator Causey‟s judgment, notwithstanding that it was 
aware that she was working part-time in violation of state-law 
requirements, and had a string of deficiencies on her watch.  
Furthermore, the Committee asserts that the Board failed to 
follow its established governance structure in not appointing a 
treasurer and a finance committee.  It thus did not discover 
Shealey‟s complete failure to maintain financial and billing 
records and his failure to bill Medicare for over $450,000 in 
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payables during one year.  The Committee likewise argues 
that, by eschewing their responsibilities, Causey and Shealey 
breached their duty of due care.  As to the duty of loyalty, the 
Committee contends that the Board and its officers breached 
their duty in that the Board “consciously chose to close the 
home so that the [Lemington Home Fund, a charitable 
lending source] could be diverted to Elder Care [another 
organization which had an interlocking Board of Directors 
with the Lemington Home],”  (Appellant‟s Br. at 33), and that 
the officers were dually employed by both the Home and 
Elder Care, with CFO Shealey allegedly commingling funds 
of the entities.  
 The evidence produced by the Committee is such that 
a fact-finder could conclude that the Home‟s directors did not 
have a reasonable basis to believe that Causey and Shealey 
were reliable and competent.  In this regard, the evidence of 
the numerous deficiencies, the death of a resident in the 
summer of 2004 that resulted in the placement of the Home‟s 
license on probationary status, the staff and operational 
deficiencies noted in the PrimusCare report, the fact that 
members of the Board knew that Causey was not working full 
time, and Shealey‟s failure to maintain even rudimentary but 
essential accounting records would enable a fact-finder to 
conclude that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty 
of care.  This same evidence would support an inference that 
Causey and Shealey did not exercise “such care, including 
reasonable inquiry, skill and diligence, as a person of ordinary 
prudence would use under similar circumstances.”  Finally, 
the evidence presented by the Committee pertaining to plans 
to divert the Lemington Home Fund to Lemington Elder Care 
suffices to create a triable issue on the duty of loyalty claim. 
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 The District Court, however, found that the business 
judgment rule as well as the doctrine of in pari delicto applied 
to shield the directors and officers from liability.  We 
disagree, and will discuss each of these doctrines to illustrate 
why they are inapplicable here. 
 1. Business Judgment Rule 
 Pennsylvania law provides that “[a]bsent breach of 
fiduciary duty, lack of good faith or self-dealing, any act as 
the board of directors, a committee of the board or an 
individual director shall be presumed to be in the best 
interests of the corporation.”  15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 5715(d) (emphasis added).  As explained in Cuker v. 
Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1048 (Pa. 1997): 
The business judgment rule should insulate 
officers and directors from judicial intervention 
in the absence of fraud or self-dealing, if 
challenged decisions were within the scope of 
the directors‟ authority, if they exercised 
reasonable diligence, and if they honestly and 
rationally believed their decisions were in the 
best interests of the company. It is obvious that 
a court must examine the circumstances 
surrounding the decisions in order to determine 
if the conditions warrant application of the 
business judgment rule. 
 
Id. at 1048.  As we have observed, “underlying the [business 
judgment] rule is the assumption that reasonable diligence has 
been used in reaching the decision which the rule is invoked 
to justify.”  Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 
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762 (3d Cir. 1974).  “Factors bearing on the board‟s decision . 
. . include whether the board . . . was disinterested, whether it 
was assisted by counsel, whether it prepared a written report, 
whether it was independent, whether it conducted an adequate 
investigation, and whether it rationally believed its decision 
was in the best interests of the corporation.”  Cuker, 692 A.2d 
at 1046.  “Whether the duty of care has been met is a question 
of fact to be determined by an examination of all the 
circumstances in the case.”  Wolf v. Fried, 373 A.2d 734, 735 
(Pa. 1977). 
 The District Court relied upon the fact that the Board 
was assisted by counsel, conducted several meetings, and 
pursued various options before approving the bankruptcy 
filing.  To be sure, this is the type of evidence that could 
support application of the business judgment rule as a matter 
of law.  But it is countered by evidence that the Board 
received numerous red flags as to the competence and 
diligence of Causey and Shealey.  The fact that the Board 
eschewed a viability study also calls into question the 
adequacy of a pre-bankruptcy investigation.  And finally, 
there is the evidence that the directors favored Lemington 
Elder Care over the Home.  Where, as here, there is evidence 
to support a rational conclusion that the directors did not 
exercise reasonable diligence, application of the business 
judgment rule cannot be decided on a summary judgment 
motion.
5
  See Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat’l Fin. Corp., 675 
F. Supp. 238, 259-61 (M.D. Pa. 1987). 
                                              
5
 The District Court erroneously held that the 
presumption of the business judgment rule is overcome only 
by evidence of gross negligence.  The District Court cited a 
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 2. In pari delicto 
 In pari delicto, expressed in its most basic form, 
prohibits courts from “lend[ing] their good offices to 
mediating disputes among wrongdoers.”  Bateman Eichler, 
Hill Richards, Inc., v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985).  For 
the doctrine of in pari delicto to apply in Pennsylvania, “the 
plaintiff [must] be an active, voluntary participant in the 
wrongful conduct or transaction(s) for which it seeks redress, 
and bear „substantially equal [or greater] responsibility for the 
underlying illegality‟ as compared to the defendant.”  Official 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & 
Research Found. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 
313, 329 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 
306-07).   
 With respect to in pari delicto in a bankruptcy context, 
“the „trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and can only 
assert those causes of action possessed by the debtor. 
[Conversely,] [t]he trustee is, of course, subject to the same 
                                                                                                     
Delaware Supreme Court case which held that “under the 
business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon 
concepts of gross negligence.”  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
805, 812 (Del. 1984) (overruled on other grounds).  
Pennsylvania, however, recognizes directors‟ and officers‟ 
liability for negligent breach of fiduciary duty.  See, e.g., Wolf 
v. Fried, 373 A.2d 734, 735 (Pa. 1977) (“[E]ven in the 
absence of fraud, self-dealing, or proof of personal profit or 
wanton acts of omission or commission, the directors of a 
corporation may be held personally liable where they have 
been imprudent, wasteful, careless and negligent and such 
actions have resulted in corporate losses.”). 
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defenses as could have been asserted by the defendant had the 
action been instituted by the debtor.‟”  Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors v. R. F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 
356 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 
1989)). 
 As the District Court noted, however, there is an 
exception to the applicability of in pari delicto, when the 
complained-of action did not actually benefit the corporation.  
Thus, although “principals generally are responsible for the 
acts of agents committed within the scope of their authority,” 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 989 A.2d at 333, “where an agent 
acts in his own interest, and to the corporation‟s detriment, 
imputation generally will not apply,”  id. at 334.  This 
“adverse interest” exception was set forth succinctly in 
Lafferty as follows:  “Under the law of imputation, courts 
impute the fraud of an officer to a corporation when the 
officer commits the fraud (1) in the course of his 
employment, and (2) for the benefit of the corporation.”  267 
F.3d at 358.  As to whether an officer‟s conduct is motivated 
by self-interest and benefits the corporation, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has outlined that “the appropriate approach . . 
. is best related back to the underlying purpose of imputation, 
which is fair risk-allocation, including the affordance of 
appropriate protection to those who transact business with 
corporations.”  PricewaterhouseCoopers, 989 A.2d at 335.   
 Here, the District Court found that, because the 
“defendants[] [did not] receive any personal benefit from its 
[sic] decision to close Lemington,” the adverse interest 
exception to the doctrine of in pari delicto did not apply.  (A. 
21.)  The Committee has presented considerable evidence that 
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the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty were from the 
defendants‟ self-interest and did not benefit the Home.  For 
example, the Committee has presented evidence that the 
officers and directors were simultaneously affiliated with both 
the Home and Lemington Elder Care, and thus stood to 
benefit from a transfer of the Home‟s principal charitable 
asset to Lemington Elder Care.  The Committee also sets 
forth that Shealey served as a Trustee of Mt. Ararat Church‟s 
community-outreach entity during the time that this entity 
was being pursued by the Board as a possible purchaser of the 
Home.  The Committee also argues that Causey resisted the 
Pittsburgh Foundation‟s recommendation to replace her with 
another individual, and that Shealey neglected to maintain 
any financial records during his tenure.  Thus, it is clear that 
the alleged actions of the directors and officers were not only 
harmful to the corporation, but also advanced their own self-
interest.  The principles of fair risk allocation, moreover, 
would likely counsel against the Home‟s assumption of the 
risk that its directors and officers would consistently engage 
in actions so completely contrary to its benefit. 
 Because the Committee has tendered sufficient 
evidence that the directors‟ and officers‟ alleged breaches of 
fiduciary duty did not benefit the Home but instead benefited 
their own self-interest, the applicability of the “adverse 
interest” exception presents a genuine issue of material fact.  
Summary judgment on this basis is therefore inappropriate. 
B. 
 Finally, it is necessary to deal with the claim of 
deepening insolvency.  This cause of action has not been 
formally recognized by Pennsylvania state courts.  Lafferty, 
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267 F.3d at 349.  Nevertheless, relying on “decisions 
interpreting the law of other jurisdictions and on the policy 
underlying Pennsylvania tort law,” this Circuit has found that 
“the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would determine that 
„deepening insolvency‟ may give rise to a cognizable 
injury.”6  Id.  We further clarified the mechanics of this cause 
of action in In re Citx Corp., 448 F.3d 672 (3d Cir. 2006).  
There, we stated that “deepening insolvency” in Pennsylvania 
is defined as “an injury to [a debtor‟s] corporate property 
from the fraudulent expansion of corporate debt and 
prolongation of corporate life.”  448 F.3d at 677.  For such a 
claim to succeed, it is necessary to demonstrate that the 
directors‟ actions caused the deepening of insolvency.  Id. at 
678.  We also concluded that fraud is necessary to support a 
                                              
6
 As Appellees have noted in their brief, courts and 
commentators have increasingly called into question the 
viability of “deepening insolvency” as an independent cause 
of action.  See, e.g., In re Global Service Group LLC, 316 
B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).  Even if our precedent is 
erroneous, however, it can only be overturned by this Court 
en banc.  See In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 262, 
274 (3d Cir. 2005) (“precedential cases cannot be overruled 
unless by the Circuit en banc”).  Consequently, we are bound 
in our decision to follow Lafferty, which recognizes 
deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action in 
Pennsylvania.  Moreover, because no party argued that the 
concept of deepening insolvency may not apply to, or may 
involve a different standard for, a non-profit corporation, we 
will not address that issue.  See United States v. Albertson, 
645 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e usually refrain from 
addressing an argument or issue not properly raised and 
discussed in the appellate briefing.”) (citation omitted). 
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claim of deepening insolvency, and that “a claim of 
negligence cannot sustain a deepening-insolvency cause of 
action.”  Id. at 681.   
 In Pennsylvania,  
[a]s a general rule, fraud consists in anything 
calculated to deceive, whether by single act or 
combination, or by suppression of truth, or a 
suggestion of what is false, whether it be by 
direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or 
silence, word of mouth, or look or gesture. It is 
any artifice by which a person is deceived to his 
disadvantage.   
 
In re Reichert’s Estate, 51 A.2d 615, 617 (Pa. 1947). 
 The Committee alleges that fraud “is apparent in the 
Board‟s failure to disclose to the creditors and the Bankruptcy 
Court the Board‟s decision made in January 2005 to close the 
Home and deplete the patient census, while delaying the 
bankruptcy filing until April 2005,” (Appellant‟s Br. at 38), 
and in “strategically omitting from the Monthly Operating 
Reports required by Debtors-in-Possession substantial fees 
paid post-petition to attorneys, accountants, and other 
consultants to transition the Home‟s resources to Elder Care,” 
(id. at 39.).  The Committee points out that as early as 
January, 2005, the Board had apparently voted to cease 
admitting new patients.  Without new patients and the 
governmental and insurance support that they would bring, it 
would be nearly impossible for the Home to generate the 
income needed to operate.  The Committee also notes that a 
consultant stated that  
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[f]rom my 2005 meetings with Arthur Baldwin 
it became clear to me that he was determined to 
shut the Lemington nursing facility down and 
had no interest in listening to or discussing any 
ideas or plans which could lead to its continued 
operation. . . . Unknown to me at the time was 
that the Lemington Board had already decided 
to shut down the home. 
 
(A. 893.)  The Committee also noted that a February 24, 2005 
memorandum from the United Way of Allegheny County 
reflects that Chairperson Baldwin had already informed 
county officials that the Home would file for bankruptcy, 
“which will lead to the closing of Lemington long-term care 
and assisted living,” and result in the transfer of its residents 
to other county facilities.  (A. 798.)  The Committee further 
points out that Attorney Robert Sable wrote a letter to 
Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield, provider of health 
insurance for the Home, on March 30, 2005, advising them 
that employee health care coverage was needed for “only an 
additional 60 days until the transition can take place.”  (A. 
1916.)  The Committee thus asserts that, although the Board 
knew that its actions would cause further deterioration of the 
Home‟s finances to the detriment of its creditors, by its 
silence, the Board consciously defrauded the Home‟s 
creditors by implementing these policies and delaying the 
filing of bankruptcy for a period of four months.  
Furthermore, with respect to the officers, the Committee 
alleges that, inter alia, the officers continued to commingle 
the Debtor‟s funds with related entities, continued to breach 
their fiduciary duties, continued to do business with vendors 
although they knew that the Home was insolvent, failed to 
collect Medicare receivables, upheld the policy of no patient 
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admissions, and directed the post-petition transfer of Debtor‟s 
kitchen and catering equipment, among other items, to related 
entities.  
 Considering this evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Committee as the non-moving party, we find that there 
is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the directors 
and officers fraudulently contributed to deepening the 
insolvency of the Home.  Summary judgment is therefore 
inappropriate with respect to the Committee‟s deepening 
insolvency claim. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment on the breach of 
fiduciary duty and deepening insolvency claims, and will 
remand for trial on these issues. 
 
